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Towards a new multilateral energy 
architecture? 
Thijs  Van de Graaf 
From climate change over peak oil to the 
geopolitical scramble for the Arctic, there 
are ample signs that a global energy crisis is 
unfolding. The sheer scale and urgency of 
this looming crisis calls for international 
coordination. Yet, even a cursory look at the 
existing international energy institutions 
leads to a sobering conclusion: the global 
energy governance architecture is weak, 
fragmented and incomplete. This policy 
brief discusses both the flaws in the 
multilateral energy architecture and some 
emerging ideas to strengthen it, such as the 
proposal for a Sustainable Energy Trade 
Agreement and the new American 
disclosure rules for the extractive sector. 
In July 2012, India was struck by the largest 
power black-out in history. No less than 22 out 
of the country’s 28 states were affected by the 
outage, comprising about 10 percent of the 
world population. Ironically, millions of people 
living in the affected areas were not actually hit 
by the power cut since they lack access to 
electricity anyway. Even for many other 
households and businesses, the effect of the 
black-out was mitigated since they are used to 
having regular grid collapses and have standby 
generators or other back-up systems. 
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This event exposes many of the energy-
related problems that governments around the 
world are struggling with. One is energy 
security, or the reliable and adequate supply of 
energy to sustain a country’s economic 
development. Another is energy poverty, or 
the fact that 1.4 billion people in the world still 
lack access to modern energy services such as 
lighting, heating and transportation. Since the 
grid fall-out was partly caused by a prolonged 
drought, which lowered India’s hydro-power 
capacity while increasing demand for 
electricity for irrigation, the event also 
illustrates the likely effects of climate change 
on our energy systems. 
It would be all too easy to relegate the 
responsibility for these three challenges – 
energy security, energy poverty, and climate 
change – solely to the Indian governments, 
authorities and utility companies. To be sure, 
Indian authorities have an important role to 
play in addressing these challenges and, 
indeed, many observers point to India’s poor 
energy governance system as one of the key 
culprits of the power fall-out. No wonder, 
then, that domestic good governance is often 
depicted as the fourth major goal of global 
energy governance. 
Nonetheless, India’s electrical fall-out is but 
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one piece of a bigger energy puzzle that 
manifests itself at a larger scale. Climate change 
is a truly planetary phenomenon, oil markets 
operate at the global level, technology transfers 
to address electricity deprivation warrant 
intercontinental North-South cooperation; in 
other words, we need some form of 
international energy governance to effectively 
deal with these transboundary challenges. 
Currently, the energy sector is not very well 
governed at the international level. There are 
several multilateral energy institutions in place, 
each focusing on a specific set of energy issues 
for a specific set of countries, but there is no 
strong system of international rules and 
regulations that puts us firmly on the path 
toward a more sustainable, equitable, reliable 
and affordable energy system. This policy brief 
illustrates the shortcomings of the current set 
of international energy institutions before 
surveying some of the emerging practices and 
ideas that may pave the way for a new and 
stronger multilateral energy architecture. 
THE GOALS OF ENERGY GOVERNANCE 
ENERGY SECURITY 
Even though energy security governance has 
traditionally been a matter of purely national 
governance, various countries have set up 
international institutions to coordinate their 
energy policies, gather and disseminate data, 
share best practices and manage emergency 
response mechanisms. The best-known such 
institution is the Paris-based International 
Energy Agency (IEA), created in the wake of 
the first oil shock. Most of the time the IEA 
serves as a sort of information clearing-house 
but occasionally it captures global prime time 
when it coordinates a release from its members’ 
strategic oil deposits, such as it did last year in 
response to the prolonged outage in Libya.  
For all its merits as an oil market watchdog 
(and, occasionally, fire brigade), the IEA’s role 
in global energy governance is curbed in several 
ways. Since the agency’s membership is 
exclusively reserved for members of the 
OECD, emerging and oil-thirsty giants such as 
China and India remain outside of the IEA. 
Clearly, the IEA cannot play the global role its 
name implies if it does not find appropriate 
ways to accommodate these emerging powers. 
Another challenge is that the IEA has 
difficulties in shedding its image as a 
conservative petroleum-focused institution. 
Even though the IEA addresses energy policy 
issues writ large, the agency is still widely 
viewed as a child of the oil agitation of the 
1970s.  
Other multilateral energy institutions hardly 
fare any better. The Organization of 
Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) is 
commonly viewed as a small club of the self-
interested, trying to maximize the oil rents for 
the club members, while acting as a spoiler in 
the climate regime. OPEC meetings are often 
characterized by quarrels, members frequently 
cheat on their allocated production quota, and 
in the end, the Saudis nearly always act as the 
swing producer to balance oil markets.  
The International Energy Forum (IEF), an 
institution created to bridge the divide between 
oil consumers and producers, has some useful 
features. Biannually, it brings together a very 
large number of energy ministers and CEO’s 
of big energy companies to discuss the state of 
the oil (and, to a lesser extent, the gas) market. 
For the participants, it offers an opportunity 
for having numerous bilateral meetings with 
colleagues in a short time span. The IEF also 
manages a system to bring more transparency 
to oil markets, the so-called Joint Oil Data 
Initiative (Jodi), but since it is based entirely on 
voluntary self-reporting, the database contains 
many gaps and inflated numbers.  
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), finally, 
was designed in the early 1990s to manage the 
energy (and, particularly, the natural gas) 
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relations between Western Europe and the 
Soviet successor states. The treaty was never 
ratified by Russia, Norway and the United 
States. Russia applied it on a provisional basis 
before formally withdrawing from it in 2009. 
The ECT and its Brussels Secretariat, which 
was conspicuously absent during the recent gas 
spats between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 
2009, clearly need an existential rethink. 
FIGHTING ENERGY POVERTY 
The widespread and persistent lack  of  access  
to  modern  energy  services  in many  rural  
areas  in  the  world  represents  yet  another  
set  of  major energy challenges, for which new 
international governance mechanisms are 
needed.   
While  energy  poverty  may  seem  to  be  a  
purely  local  political  issue  at first sight, its 
sheer scale makes it a global issue. About 1.4 
billion people currently have no access to 
electricity in their homes, which is essential to a 
decent quality of life. An even higher number 
of people, 2.7 billion, relies on traditional 
biomass for cooking,  with  dire  consequences  
not  only  for  their  health  and  education  but  
also for  the  environment,  as  it  leads  to  soil  
degradation  and  deforestation.   
Energy poverty is an important issue for 
global governance because it is of  critical  
importance  to  the  success  of  the  broader  
anti-poverty  agenda.  It  is increasingly  
recognized  that  greater  quality  and  quantity  
of  energy  services  is required  to  meet  the  
Millennium  Development  Goals  (MDG).  
Indeed,  the  fight against energy poverty is 
often depicted as the “missing” MDG.  
The absence of a specific MDG for energy 
services is one clear indication  of  how  the  
theme  of  energy  access  has  long  been  
overlooked  in international policy processes. 
Multilateral donor agencies such as the World 
Bank have  devoted  some  attention  to  energy  
access  but,  in  practice,  the Bank’s neoliberal 
structural reforms have done little to 
incentivize the provision of energy services to 
the poor nor to reduce overall figures of energy 
poverty.  
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 
Climate change, thirdly, is arguably the most 
defining issue of our time. The intricate link 
between global warming and our energy system 
is evident: fossil fuels provide 80 percent of 
global energy while being responsible for 
almost 60 percent of global greenhouse gas 
emissions. Clearly, any reasonable global CO2 
mitigation plan must involve a reconfiguration 
of the energy sector, by allowing us to shift to 
low-carbon fuels and sources. Admittedly, 
some observers put high faith in carbon 
capture and sequestration (CCS) projects, but 
given the cost and the fact that this technology 
is not yet demonstrated on a large-enough 
scale, CCS is far from a silver bullet to solve the 
energy-climate conundrum. 
With only 37 industrialized countries 
committing themselves to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2% on average 
for the period 2008-2012, it was obvious from 
the outset that the Kyoto Protocol was never 
going to be enough to stop climate change. As 
large developing countries continued to grow 
(and pollute) at an astonishing pace, it has 
become ever more clear that no international 
climate agreement can be meaningful without 
the participation of these emerging powers. 
Yet, at the same time it has raised ethical 
questions about the differentiated responsibility 
for climate change and has thus stirred political 
tensions. 
Today the global climate negotiations are in 
complete political deadlock, much like that 
other grand multilateral endeavor, the WTO’s 
Doha Development Round. Last year’s 
conference of the parties (COP) in Durban 
barely kept the international negotiation 
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process alive by extending Kyoto for a few more 
years. Durban made it clear that no post-Kyoto 
protocol will enter into force until 2020, much 
too late according to various observers. The 
International Energy Agency (IEA) has warned 
that, if the world is to stay below 2 degrees 
Celsius of warming, then emissions must be kept 
in check to no more than 450 parts per million 
(ppm) of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere; the 
level is currently around 390 ppm. If we do not 
undertake action, by 2017, we will be “locked” 
into a carbon path that will tip us over the 
dangerous 2 degrees target. 
GOOD GOVERNANCE 
A fourth major challenge is good governance. 
The upstream energy sector has always been 
particularly susceptible to corruption because of 
the concentration of hydrocarbon reserves in 
countries that have weak democratic institutions.  
Advocacy groups such as Human Rights 
Watch and Global Witness have issued 
numerous reports on the alleged complicity in 
the misuse of government revenues from oil and 
gas extraction by firms operating in repressive or 
poorly governed countries. To counter such 
corruption, the United Kingdom spearheaded 
the launch of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2002, calling 
on firms to publish accounts on what they pay 
to governments. To date, the EITI schemes 
remain entirely voluntary. 
Still, as Ann Florini has argued, many oil 
companies do not shy away from doing business 
in countries whose track record on human rights 
is less than stellar. What is more, some 
companies are accused of complicity to human 
rights violations. Shell has been criticized for 
alleged complicity in human rights violations in 
Nigeria in the 1990s, the American oil firm 
Unocal has been sued for human rights atrocities 
in Myanmar, and Chinese oil companies have 
been vehemently criticized for their operations 
in Darfur. 
FLAWS IN THE GLOBAL ENERGY 
ARCHITECTURE 
Clearly, the global energy architecture is unable 
to provide long-lasting solutions to the key 
challenges of energy governance. The relatively 
sparse energy governance institutions that exist 
are fragmented and lack authority. Global 
energy governance consists of a chaotic and 
scattered mish-mash of institutions, rule-
systems, clubs and significant governance gaps. 
Within this patchwork, there is hardly any 
coordination or legal hierarchy. Universally 
accepted norms are missing. 
Moreover, the existing arrangements are 
limited in scope, representation, and 
effectiveness.  
• Scope. International energy institutions 
have focused predominantly on the 
expansion of energy markets and far less 
on energy access for developing countries 
or environmental protection. While there 
is cooperation on energy research and 
technology, there is little sustained effort 
to fundamentally rethink the global energy 
supply system. The energy governance 
architecture is replete with narrow, sector-
based institutions that tend to defend 
“their” sector (e.g., IAEA for nuclear, the 
IEA for oil/gas/CCS, and now IRENA 
for renewables). The proper way to deal 
with the energy crisis is to switch the focus 
from energy sources and supply to 
demand management and “energy 
services,” such as efficiently generated 
electricity for heating, cooking and 
transportation. 
• Representation. There are few energy 
governance institutions that bring together 
a broad spectrum of stakeholders in an 
equitable setting. International energy 
institutions are often fragmented along the 
producer-consumer divide (e.g., IEA and 
OPEC) or they are dominated by Western 
countries. Emerging countries such as 
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China and India, but also the lion’s share of 
developing countries are generally not (well) 
represented. Organizations such as the IEA 
and the World Bank have been accused of 
having an obvious Northern agenda and 
prioritizing the energy needs of developed 
countries. 
• Effectiveness. Current global energy 
governance arrangements flagrantly fail to 
realize the four outlined objectives. 
Moreover, the fragmented architecture is 
not well equipped to deal with the 
interconnectedness of those energy 
challenges. Institutions working in isolation 
seldom discover policy synergies or deal 
effectively with trade-offs. 
NEW APPROACHES AND IDEAS 
In spite of this depressing overview of global 
energy institutions, promising new approaches, 
practices and ideas are constantly emerging. The 
remainder of this policy brief will home in on 
four of them: the creation of IRENA, the UN’s 
SE4ALL initiative, the plea for a plurilateral 
trade agreement on clean energy, and the new 
disclosure rules for extractive industries. 
IRENA 
The creation of the International Renewable 
Energy Agency (IRENA) in 2009 is the single 
most important innovation in global energy 
governance of the past decade. IRENA, which 
currently boasts an impressive total of 150 
members, is noteworthy for two reasons. 
First, in an era of stagnating institutional 
innovation in global environmental governance, 
the creation of an entirely new bureaucracy has 
become quite exceptional. Its rapid negotiation, 
ratification and institutional set-up processes 
make IRENA even more remarkable. No 
comparably large and institutionalized 
international organization has been created over 
the past 10 years. 
Second, IRENA is the first major 
international organization that is set up to 
navigate and hasten the transition to more 
sustainable energy sources, in all of their 
occurring forms. By focusing on a 
transformation of the energy sector, it tackles 
head on the principal underlying cause of some 
of the world’s major environmental problems 
such as air pollution, acid rain, and climate 
change.  
In that respect, IRENA differs from the 
large and growing body of international rules 
that has been adopted to manage the plethora 
of energy-related environmental externalities, 
such as the Kyoto Protocol, the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by 
Ships (MARPOL), and many others. Even as 
those international environmental treaties 
obviously affect the energy sector, they do not 
lead to a radical departure from our current 
energy path. IRENA, by contrast, intends to 
do just that. 
To be sure, IRENA is no standard-setting 
organization, nor is it able to impose legally 
binding obligations on its members. The 
agency is not designed to serve as a framework 
for negotiating such binding obligations. 
Instead, IRENA focuses on the gathering and 
dissemination of knowledge related to 
renewable energy technologies and policies.  
Most importantly, IRENA will give a voice 
to the sector of renewables on the global stage 
and act as a cheerleader to spur the 
development and diffusion of renewables and, 
hence, the decarbonization of our energy 
systems. 
SE4ALL 
On the front of energy deprivation, things are 
moving too. The United Nations (UN) have 
declared 2012 the International Year of 
Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL). UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has put 
together an Advisory Group on Energy and 
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Climate Change, which has recommended to 
meet three objectives by 2030: 
1. ensuring universal access to modern 
energy services; 
2. doubling the rate of improvement in 
energy efficiency; and 
3. doubling the share of renewable energy 
in the global energy mix. 
These recommendations were taking up during 
the talks at the Rio+20 conference on 
sustainable development, held in June 2012. 
One important outcome of the Rio+20 summit 
was the agreement to integrate these three goals 
into a broader set of Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), which are designed to succeed 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
in 2015. 
While this is a worthwhile endeavor, policy-
makers could also contemplate the inclusion of 
the three targets in an updated version of the 
St. Petersburg Principles on Energy Security, 
agreed upon by the G8 in 2006, which could 
then also be echoed through the G20 process 
(e.g., put on the agenda of the G20’s Working 
Group on Development) and the UN General 
Assembly. 
GREEN TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
One of the big fears surrounding the spread of 
renewable energy sources and technologies is 
that international competition in clean energy 
will backfire. The best-case scenario would be 
that global competition in green technology 
innovation will lead to a race to the top, 
spurring the rapid development and spread of 
renewables. 
However, if countries are too much focused 
on national competitiveness, there is a clear risk 
of looming trade wars and green protectionism. 
There are already a lot of barriers to free trade 
in sustainable energy goods and services, 
notably in the form of domestic content 
requirements for key components that make up 
a sustainable energy system. For example, 
Japan and the EU have protested at the WTO 
that the Canadian Province of Ontario is 
stipulating that new solar and wind facilities 
must be built with a certain amount of 
domestically manufactured components.  
The United States has in recent months also 
levied tariffs on Chinese solar panels and wind 
turbine towers because the Chinese companies 
have allegedly enjoyed unfair government 
support. The European Union (EU) could 
possibly follow in the US footsteps. Moreover, 
Brussels has included airline companies into its 
Emission Trading System as of 1 January 2012, 
provoking much criticism from third countries. 
Many countries also restrict foreign 
investment in industries such as electricity 
generation and distribution, which may also 
hamper the rapid development of renewables. 
China has limited its exports of rare earths, 
some of which are absolutely critical to 
renewable energy. 
These are but a few examples of how the 
unfolding clean energy race risks to engender 
new trade tensions. In order to prevent this 
from happening, the ICTSD, a Geneva-based 
think-tank has recently come up with a 
proposal for a Sustainable Energy Trade 
Agreement. The basic idea of the agreement 
would be to overcome trade distortions and 
speed up the development of clean energy and 
renewables across the globe.   
PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY 
In August 2012, the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a 
stringent set of rules that require US-listed 
companies to publish details of payments to 
countries where they extract resources. 
Previous efforts to create transparency, such as 
the EITI, were entirely voluntary. 
The rules, which were required under the 
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2010 Dodd-Frank financial reform law, force 
companies to disclose — country by country 
and project by project — how much they pay 
governments around the world for access to 
their oil, natural gas and minerals.  
This kind of transparency makes it possible 
to find the theft and waste that devastates poor 
but resource-rich countries. The EU should 
now move to adopt similar rules as the US. 
Moreover, the G20 should consider the 
creation of a global standard for reporting to 
allow comparison of payments made by US and 
EU companies. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This policy brief has identified four major goals 
of global energy governance: 
1. providing energy security; 
2. combating energy poverty; 
3. addressing climate change; 
4. domestic good governance. 
A cursory review of the current system of 
global energy governance leads to a grim 
conclusion: the global energy architecture is not 
up to the gigantic task of bringing the world’s 
energy system in line with the above-mentioned 
goals. The multilateral energy institutions we 
have at our disposal are too limited in terms of 
scope, representation and effectiveness. 
The energy governance architecture is 
constantly evolving, though, and often for the 
better. The creation of IRENA in 2009 was a 
milestone event that could make a real dent for 
climate change mitigation, energy security and 
rural electrification in the developing world. 
The SEC’s new regulations on oil payments 
could be a real shot in the arm for transparency 
and economic growth in developing countries. 
And with Ban Ki-Moon’s SE4ALL initiative, 
the fight against energy poverty is finally 
gathering steam.  
These are far from the only ideas on global 
energy governance reform that are currently 
floating. This last January, for example, the 
Chinese government called for a new 
international mechanism to stabilize oil 
markets. A few years ago, former Russian 
President Medvedev has called for a new 
Eurasian gas treaty to replace the ECT.  
As long as energy security and climate 
change concerns continue to top the 
international agenda, the debate on a reform of 
global energy governance institutions will not 
wane. This provides an excellent opportunity 
to rebuild the international system of rules, 
institutions and regulations to realize the grand 
objectives of global energy governance.  
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